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Abstract 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fishery is an important global 
food resource, and the economies of many Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) rely heavily 
on tuna industries. This paper proposes that governance by PICs is the key to improving 
the sustainability and profitability of tuna industries in the region. ‘Governance’ is 
usually used to refer to corruption, but here is interpreted more broadly to encompass 
the whole process by which decisions regarding public life are made and enacted, by 
government and also civil society. Argument is supported by empirical material from an 
interview study with stakeholders and a survey of reports.  
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1. Introduction 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is home to the largest tuna 
fishery in the world. In 2004 51 per cent of the world’s tuna catch was from the WCPO 
(SPC 2004). Messages of gradually increasing concern have been delivered by the 
Oceanic Fisheries Program of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) over the 
last decade regarding bigeye, and latterly yellowfin. Stock assessment from the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) First Regular Scientific Committee 
Meeting held in August 2005 shows these species are being overfished, although the 
degree to which this is happening varies regionally across the WCPO (WCPFC 2005). 
Despite these messages, fishing activity has been allowed to increase substantially 
(Greenpeace c.2005).1 The response of the second WCPFC meeting in December 2005 
to the WCPFC Scientific Committee's 2005 recommendations (WCPFC 2005) is 
considered by some not be sufficiently precautionary because: i) it allows purse seine 
and longline effort to remain at levels which will continue to allow overfishing; ii) the 
use of Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) in the purse seine fishery has not been limited 
as far as some hoped; iii) the cap set under the Vessel Days Scheme (VDS) is 
inadequate to address concern over key bigeye and yellowfin stocks; and iv) Pacific 
Islands Countries’ (PICs) domestic industries have effectively been exempted from 
most management measures. The effects of the various tuna fisheries in the WCPO need 
to be carefully analysed and appropriate, effective biological and economic 
management measures implemented in order to preserve and improve sustainability and 
optimise economic benefits. 
                                                 
1 There are some limits on purse seine fishing effort imposed through the Palau Arrangement between the 
countries hosting the bulk of purse seine fishing (Parties to the Nauru Agreement [PNA], the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Tuvalu) and its replacement, the much anticipated Vessel Days Scheme, but these are of themselves 
insufficient to halt the current trend towards overfishing and stock decline. For further information on the 
establishment of the Palau Arrangement and the PNA see Aqorau and Bergin (1997). 
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Sustaining and maximising income from WCPO tuna fisheries are particularly 
important because they are economically crucial to most PICs. Apart from domestic 
industries and food security issues, access fees paid by distant water fishing countries 
constitute an important source of revenue for many PICs. Access fees make up as much 
as 40-50 per cent of Kiribati’s revenue, and 22 per cent of the gross domestic product 
(Government of Kiribati 2003). PICs need fisheries management regimes that maximise 
economic efficiency while maintaining ecosystems, as does everyone else enjoying food 
supplies and ecosystem benefits from the Pacific Ocean. 
Regional organizations (such as the WCPFC, the Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency [FFA] and the SPC), fishing companies, fishing states, aid donors, 
and non-government organizations all have important roles to play in improving the 
economic and biological performance of the region’s tuna fisheries. None of these 
groups alone, however, can institute the measures necessary to make these 
improvements. Starting from the basic fact that only PIC governments can legislate for 
and enforce fisheries management in their jurisdictions, PIC governments, particularly 
if they act cooperatively, potentially have more power than any of the other stakeholders 
to improve fisheries management. For example, the majority of the purse seine fishery 
in the WCPO (around 65 per cent) is carried out in the exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) of FFA countries (see Figure 1). Access to these waters is thus essential for the 
economic operation of the purse seine fleet, so on paper at least the FFA group of 
countries have control over the purse seine fishery.2 The question is whether PIC 
governments, both individually and collectively, have the capacity and the will to use 
this power to drive fisheries management improvements. Thus far PIC governments 
have not shown an inclination to use this power to lead a strong push for improvements 
in WCPO tuna fisheries. Exercising this power is not easy, since the costs and benefits 
                                                 
2 The longline fishery is more difficult to control, given that the reverse situation prevails, with most fish 
taken on the high seas. 
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of restraint, particularly in the purse seine sector are unevenly distributed, both between 
distant water fishing interests and within the FFA group. We propose that conceiving of 
fisheries management as a broad governance issue helps bring into focus some of the 
factors affecting PIC governments’ performance in this sector.  
This paper is based on research conducted in 2005 consisting of interviews with 
stakeholders and a survey of reports on tuna fisheries in the WCPO across a 
representative selection of six independent PICs—Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Cook Islands, and Fiji. While regional cooperation is also 
vital for fisheries management in the WCPO, this paper focuses on the role of 
governments in their domestic sphere in influencing profitability and sustainability of 
tuna industries. Background information about the WCPO fishery is presented and the 
concept of governance discussed, then effects of reforms that have been carried out in 
these PICs are outlined. The main part of the paper discusses access fees, social and 
political factors in fisheries, and the extent to which consultative processes are used in 
fisheries in PICs. The examples used demonstrate that improved governance is a vital 
first step to improving profitability and sustainability in WCPO tuna fisheries. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Governance of Fisheries 
Governance refers to the process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and 
influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social 
development. Governance is a broader notion than government, whose principal elements 
include the constitution, legislature, executive and judiciary. Governance involves interaction 
between these formal institutions and those of civil society (The Governance Working Group of 
the International Institute of Administrative Sciences as quoted in GDRC 2006).  
 
Fisheries management may be characterized as part of the governance of 
fisheries. An ideal of fisheries governance might involve government working with 
industry and other stakeholders to manage fisheries such that they are sustainable and 
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profitable. Aid donors have been concerned with governance as a central development 
issue for several years now, but unfortunately a ‘good governance’ agenda has been 
pushed in ways that have implied that donor countries have ‘good’ governance while 
aid recipients have corrupt and/or incompetent ‘bad’ governance (Johnson 1997). The 
collapse of Enron in the USA and the more recent scandal of the Australian Wheat 
Board paying bribes to Saddam Hussein’s regime, however, show that problematic 
governance is as rife in ‘the West’ as it is anywhere. This paper aims to move beyond 
the potentially condescending ‘good governance’ approach to consider the influences of 
specific governance arrangements on the success of fisheries, and suggest changes that 
may promote or impede sustainability and profitability. In this approach governance is 
analysed not as something ‘good’ or ‘bad’ but as something that frames economic 
environments in particular ways—facilitating (or otherwise) sustainable and profitable 
business development.  
 
2.2 The Fishery 
The WCPO oceanic tuna fishery is based on four key species—skipjack, 
yellowfin, bigeye and albacore tuna. The tropical tuna species are more productive than 
the more temperate tunas, including the heavily overfished Pacific bluefin and southern 
bluefin tunas. The most productive area for tuna lies in the equatorial zone (10ºN-10ºS) 
where around 80 per cent of all tuna from the WCPO are caught. Skipjack and small 
yellowfin and bigeye tuna school (frequently together) on the ocean surface and are 
commonly found in the tropical and subtropical waters of the WCPO. Larger yellowfin 
and bigeye are generally found in deeper water, where they are more widespread, 
although some larger yellowfin are also caught in free-swimming schools. In contrast to 
skipjack and yellowfin tuna, albacore concentrate in temperate areas where food is 
abundant.  
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There are three main types of tuna fishing conducted in the WCPO; purse seine, 
longline and pole-and-line (SPC 2005). The provisional 2004 purse seine catch of 
around 1,200,000 metric tons was the highest on record and the catch has been around 
this high level for the past three years (Williams and Reid 2004). Purse seine vessels 
primarily target surface-swimming skipjack, with associated catches of small yellowfin 
and bigeye. The operation is highly technology- and capital-intensive, with new vessels 
costing in excess of USD$25 million. Distant water fishing fleets from Korea, Taiwan, 
Japan, and the United States of America (USA) account for around 75 per cent of the 
purse seine catch, with vessels based in PICs fishing under the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM) Arrangement and Philippines vessels catching the balance (Williams 
and Reid 2004).3 The fishery is a high volume, relatively low value (per tonne) fishery. 
In recent times many fleets have suffered from a profitability squeeze with increasing 
fuel and other costs and global oversupply intermittently depressing prices. While prices 
have trended upwards in recent times, and the catches per unit of fishing effort (CPUE – 
a measure of efficiency) have increased substantially for some fleets, the fact that fuel 
price has increased by around 300% since 2002 (Krampe 2006) has tended to offset 
these gains. The Taiwanese fleet, however, has expanded substantially in recent years, 
and may be considered as an indication of i) relatively profitable operation (due both to 
low costs and increases in efficiency and ii) confidence in the future. It would be useful 
to understand more about the cost-price structure of this and other fleets, including any 
possible hidden subsides that may apply.  Conversely, the USA fleet has been 
particularly hard hit and the numbers of vessels operating in the WCPO have reduced 
from around 50 when the USA multilateral access treaty was first signed in the 1980s to 
less than 20 vessels in 2005.  
                                                 
3 The FSM (Federated States of Micronesia) Arrangement is a reciprocal access agreement between 
members of the PNA Group countries that gives priority to local and locally based vessels. 
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The longline fishery accounts for around 10–12 per cent of the total WCPO 
catch (around 220,000mt in 2004) but is about the same value as the larger purse seine 
catch, reflecting its uses for premium sashimi and other higher (than canning) value 
products (Williams and Reid 2004). This method targets fewer, larger, deeper-
swimming tuna using hooks set over a minimum of tens of kilometers of ocean. 
Longline vessels in the WCPO are of two main types; large, distant water freezer 
vessels (which tend to be based in distant water fishing countries) and smaller offshore 
vessels specializing in chilled fish (which tend to be based in PICs). In recent years 
domestic longline fishing has suffered from periods of falling or stagnant prices in the 
major markets and rising fuel and airfreight costs. As with the purse seine fleet, the 
profitability and hence attractiveness for investment between longline fleets varies 
widely. The low-cost Chinese and Taiwanese fleets continue to expand at a greater rate 
than the declining Japanese and Korean fleets, with Taiwan increasing its distant water 
longline fleet from 78-137 vessels between 2000 and 2004 (SPC 2005).  
Catches by pole-and-line vessels in the WCPO has been around 270-300,000 
metric tons in recent years. More than 90 per cent is taken by Indonesian and Japanese 
fleets. Since pole-and-line fisheries target the same species (skipjack) as purse seiners, 
the overall efficiency of purse seining has resulted in a marked decline in the number of 
pole-and-line vessels in the WCPO. This is unfortunate, since the pole-and-line method 
is the least ecologically damaging and most labour intensive of the three main tuna 
fishing methods used in the WCPO. The medium scale shore-based pole-and-line 
fisheries that have been based in PICs are much higher cost per tonnage of fish than the 
purse seine method. Inability to compete on price with purse seine product means pole-
and-line fisheries formerly operating in Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Kiribati 
are no longer active, only one vessel is now operating (seasonally) in Fiji, and the small 
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fleet operating in Solomon Islands is suffering financial viability problems (Barclay 
2005).  
There are thus problems with sustainability and/or profitability in all of these 
three fisheries. Profitability is the main problem for the pole-and-line fishery, while 
domestic longline fleets are suffering from both profitability and sustainability 
problems. Purse seining itself is not yet experiencing problems with catch per unit of 
effort (CPUE), but 2005 WCPFC Scientific Committee data indicates that purse seine 
activities are contributing to sustainability problems in the longline fishery. An 
interesting point about the WCPO tuna fishery is that profitability and sustainability 
components are in different relationships to each other in different sectors. Most 
notably, yellowfin and bigeye stock depletion make the southern longline fishery 
unprofitable long before biologically significant impacts on those stocks as a whole 
occur. And the equatorial purse seine skipjack fishery may remain profitable even after 
the overall yellowfin and bigeye stocks are driven below biologically sustainable levels. 
Views on tuna development and the impacts of various management measures, such as 
a reduction in effort in a given gear type (such as longline or purse seine), thus vary 
between PICs across the region.  
 
3. Improving Profitability and Sustainability through 
Governance 
 The ways in which governance can improve profitability in fisheries in the 
Pacific by improving the business environment have been discussed in many reports 
(ADB 1997; Petersen 2002; Chapman 2004; Gillett 2003; Barclay and Cartwright 
2005). Most PICs suffer from geographic disadvantages in being small economies 
distant from established trade routes, but PIC governments have contributed to 
economic problems through policy choices. The Taiwanese fishing company Ting Hong 
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was infamous for its short-term gain mentality in the 1990s, but it should be noted that 
PIC governments have attracted this style of operation by making it very difficult for 
locally based companies with more long-term visions to be successful. One of the ways 
PIC governments have discouraged business development in the past was through state 
ownership of tuna enterprises. After decades of failure by state owned enterprises there 
is now less state ownership, but other problems persist, such as lack of coordination 
between government departments and policy instability (Bowman 2005), inconsistent 
tax regimes (Hand 1999) and systems of land tenure that are not amenable to capitalist 
development. Tuna industries rely on a range of government services including fisheries 
licensing, foreign investment and working visa approvals, food safety administration for 
export destinations, and administration of land tenure, but these services are not always 
timely, accessible, effective, consistent or reasonably priced. 
Over the last decade changes to fisheries governance in terms of departmental 
reform and restructuring in PNG, Marshall Islands, Fiji and Cook Islands have led to 
improved business environments and therefore greater private sector development. For 
example, purely through governance reforms Cook Islands went from having no tuna 
industry to speak of to having tuna exports rival pearl exports, adding depth and 
diversity to an economy in which pearls and tourism were virtually the only private 
sector opportunities. Other PICs that have been unable or unwilling to reform fisheries 
management, such as Solomon Islands and Kiribati, have had stagnant private sector 
development (Barclay and Cartwright 2005). 
In the late 1990s PNG embarked on a restructuring of the fisheries department, 
which had focussed mainly on small scale rural fisheries extension services. A statutory 
authority the National Fisheries Authority (NFA) was created to service industry and 
collect fees on behalf of government. PNG’s experiences offer many useful lessons 
about the effects of governance on fisheries development. As a statutory authority that 
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raised its own revenue the NFA was able to pay its staff more and provide better 
equipment and facilities, which tended to improve performance. One measure of this 
improvement is that the amount of access fees negotiated from distant water fleets by 
NFA jumped from an estimated USD$5.8 million in 1999 (Gillett and Lightfoot 2002) 
to over USD$9 million in 2002 (Lewis 2005), to USD$13.6 million in 2003.4 
Fisheries policy was also changed during this time, to facilitate the development 
of locally based industries. There had been no long lining in PNG since the 1980s. After 
the reforms, from 1995 around 40 locally owned longline vessels operated from several 
different locations around the country. Policies were also changed to entice distant 
water purse seine companies to set up processing factories on shore, starting with RD in 
Madang in 1997, followed by South Seas Tuna in Wewak in 2004 and Frabelle in Lae 
in 2006. Improved administration and the new policies thus contributed to a boom in 
domestic development. The value of PNG’s tuna exports went from around PGK3.5 
million in 1996 to over PGK220 million in 2002 (Gomez 2005).  
These positive improvements to revenues raised through fisheries and the extent 
of domestic fisheries economic activity, however, do not mean that PNG fisheries 
governance reforms have been an unqualified success. For example, the economic 
soundness of coercing/enticing domestic investment through fisheries access is 
questionable; if such investment were economically viable coercing/enticing should not 
be necessary. One report estimates that the level of tax relief given to RD means lost 
revenue cancels out the development gains of having the large processing factory 
employing 3,000 people in Madang (Gillett Preston and Associates 2000c). PNG’s 
endemic corruption (Pitts 2002) also negated some of the gains achieved in the reforms, 
in that apparently not all the revenue from access fees actually made its way to 
government coffers (Lewis 2005).  
                                                 
4 Preston, Garry. 2005. Fisheries management consultant, Gillett Preston and Associates. Personal 
communication (email) 17 December. 
GOVERNANCE OF TUNA INDUSTRIES IN THE WCPO 12 
PNG’s governance reforms have also yet to demonstrate improvements in thus 
sustainability of tuna fisheries. As the major tuna fishing ground in the equatorial 
Pacific, PNG is the key to fisheries management for the region, but has not made any 
substantial changes to policy in response to the alarming figures presented at the 
WCPFC in 2005 (WCPFC 2005). This is despite the fact that falling catch rates for the 
most valuable types of fish apparently caused by equatorial purse seining is one of the 
factors that has caused the collapse of most of PNG’s domestic longline companies after 
2002. 
Governance has failed to protect the profitability of the PNG longline industry in 
various ways. For example, PNG’s national carrier Air Niugini enjoys monopoly status. 
Air Niugini did not effectively have the capacity or the route connections to be suitable 
for chilled fresh tuna exports, and its prices were uncompetitive, so PNG longline 
fishing companies tried to organize charter flights from an airfreight company. Air 
Niugini, however, lobbied to prevent departmental approvals for regular use of the 
airfreight company and prevented any tuna shipments not using Air Niugini from using 
the cold store facilities for tuna at Port Moresby airport (The National 2005). In 2005 
the company Heavylift finally secured permission to run regular tuna freight flights 
from Port Moresby (without access to the cold store) but by that time all of the longline 
fisheries outside Port Moresby had closed down, in part due to the high price and 
logistical difficulties of Air Niugini’s services (Tai 2004).  
While PNG’s governance reforms facilitated a boom in domestic tuna business 
development, therefore, PNG’s governance has still impeded profitability, and has 
failed to seriously tackle sustainability issues. 
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3.1 Governance of Distant Water Fishing Access  
 Many commentators have remarked on how little of the gross value of the 
WCPO tuna fishery (five to six per cent) is returned to PICs through access fees paid by 
distant water fishing countries (for example, Petersen 2002). Access fees, however, 
have to come from profits and it is arguable that with current economic circumstances 
facing the fishery higher percentage fees might not be feasible. The multilateral treaty 
with the United States fleet currently pays more than twenty per cent of the landed vale 
of the steadily decreasing catch by that fleet (and was around eleven per cent even at the 
time of negotiation) but agreements based solely on commercial considerations (rather 
than strategic or political considerations) seem unlikely to achieve more than eight per 
cent of the landed value of the catch. This is considered to be the ceiling in most tuna 
fisheries, with even six per cent seen as a burdensome 'royalty payment' (Lewis 2005).  
Nevertheless, there are ways PICs can increase the revenue raised through access 
license fees through improved governance of access agreements.  
Some form of ‘gift’ to coastal state negotiators was widely assumed by 
interviewees to be part of distant water access negotiations. It was felt that such gifts 
were probably a negative influence on the outcome for PICs, because they carry an 
expectation that the recipients of gifts would not push so hard for higher fees or strict 
fisheries management. Dealing with corruption in access fee negotiations may have an 
immediate positive effect on the amounts of revenue generated. In Solomon Islands the 
fisheries department was audited in 2003 and several millions of (US) dollars were 
found to be missing (Islands Business 2004). Since 2003 the Solomon Islands 
government has taken steps to make fisheries officials accountable for apparent 
corruption with license fees, and has undertaken a government-wide initiative to 
improve administrative systems; with budgets tied to documented planning, budget 
estimates, and annual reporting of achievements and expenditure. Solomon Islands’ 
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access fees jumped from an estimated USD$1.9 million in 1998 to USD$3.9 in 2004 
(Barclay and Cartwright 2005). As in PNG improvements were due to the fact that fees 
were making their way to government bank accounts instead of personal ones, and also 
due to improved negotiations based on realistic fees. 
Governance of access agreements is not just about corruption and anti-
corruption, however. Effective administration of access agreements is also crucial. 
Capacity is a large factor in effective administration. Small government departments 
find it difficult enough to develop the necessary human resources in fisheries biology, 
let alone the financial expertise needed to work out the best basis for calculating fees, 
and to independently check market figures to make sure fishers are paying the 
appropriate amounts. Yet without this financial expertise governments cannot be sure 
they are being paid all they should be under access agreements (McCoy and Gillett 
2005; van Santen and Muller 2000; FFA 2001).  
In the past, FFA provided staff to sit in on bilateral access negotiations as 
technical advisers to PICs but this practice ceased in the early 1990s.5 For some, the 
presence of an adviser (usually not a Pacific Islander) was seen as patronizing, and 
unnecessary once capacity was developed in PICs. Others, however, are of the view that 
such assistance would prevent the use of spurious data and prices by distant water 
fishing countries and increase transparency in light of ‘gifts’ and other corrupt practices. 
As well as improving integrity and effectiveness in administration of access 
agreements, another way PICs may increase the revenue from access fees is to rethink 
the way access agreements are negotiated. One of the most commonly raised strategies 
to improve PICs’ return from distant water fleets is that they should negotiate 
collectively with distant water fishing countries rather than on a bilateral basis. Thus far 
the only multilateral agreement is with the USA fleet. Reasons PICs have not 
                                                 
5 Although FFA continued to provide, on demand, a range of market intelligence and other information to 
assist in access negotiations for member countries. 
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cooperated for multilateral agreements with other fishing countries include: reluctance 
among PIC officials to ‘surrender sovereignty’ or to lose the capacity to negotiate 
‘tailor-made’ agreements suited to their particular countries; the fear that bilateral aid 
from fishing countries might be cut if PICs join a multilateral push to negotiate fees; 
and unwillingness to forgo personal ‘perks’ from bilateral negotiations on the part of 
PIC fisheries officials. 
In addition to multilateral negotiations, there are other ways PICs could rethink 
their approach to distant water fisheries access. A recent ADB report (ADB 2005) 
argues that PICs’ past and current practice of maximising access fees though high levels 
of fishing, without due regard for fisheries management, has resulted in a race-to-fish 
that is likely to reduce the overall economic benefit available from the fishery, and thus 
limit the amount fishing companies can pay in fees (see Figures 2 and 3). If PICs were 
to stop treating access fee negotiations as a revenue issue separate to fisheries 
management, and instead consider the long-term generation of revenue as part of 
fisheries management, WCPO tuna fisheries would arguably be both more sustainable 
and profitable. If effective fisheries management is able to prevent overfishing and the 
inevitable associated catch and revenue declines, DWFNs may be willing to maintain or 
increase payments to PICs for fishing opportunities. Profitable DWFNs can also 
improve the potential for profitability in domestic tuna fisheries. 
Early bio-economic modelling work by FFA and SPC suggested that reductions 
in purse seine effort could yield substantial overall increases in economic benefits, 
principally by reducing catches, increasing CPUE and price (by restricting supply) and 
reducing the costs of fishing. Some of these findings led to assertions that the key to 
PICs increasing economic benefit from the purse seine fishery was to restrict effort (see 
for example, ADB 2003). More recent bio-economic modelling work (Reid Bertignac 
and Hampton 2006) has questioned this perspective, noting that as skipjack catches 
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have increased, CPUE has been maintained, or in some cases increased. Revenue 
streams from access fees have increased by ten per cent in the period 1999-2003 (Lewis 
2004). Using an updated bio-economic model the economic benefits (rent) of reducing 
effort in the purse seine fishery, while present, are forecast to be substantially less, 
although the effect on reduced supply in terms of increased prices could increase that 
benefit.  
In any event, while the more recent work demonstrates that earlier arguments 
about reducing purse seine effort for sustainability and profitability were too simplistic, 
the fact remains that bigeye and yellowfin stock depletion remains a problem for both 
the purse seine and longline fisheries, and that successful management is the key to both 
sustainability and profitability. An example of a strategy following this logic would be 
if the PNA group of countries (which have the power to control purse seine fishing in 
the region) were to: i) use a sub-regional arrangement to fully ‘pool’ fisheries access to 
their combined EEZs; ii) put in place credible measures to prevent overfishing; and iii) 
use rights-based management approaches to sell long-term rights (as long as ten years), 
thereby giving fishing companies maximum confidence in their investment.6  
PICs have never tried most of the ideas that have been proposed about 
rethinking the way access fees are negotiated in order to increase access fees. One 
reason PICs have not explored new ways of conducting access arrangements is that 
most of these strategies have been proposed in reports by consultants submitted to the 
FFA Secretariat. The strategies have not been workshopped with PIC officials in 
consultative forums. Another reason is that small government departments trying to get 
by on very limited resources simply do not have the human resources (in terms of 
numbers or range of expertise) to try new ways of organizing negotiations. Access fees 
are thus an area where improved governance in the areas of corruption, effectiveness of 
                                                 
6 Thomas Gloerfelt-Tarp, Senior Natural Resources Specialist, Pacific Operations Division, Asian 
Development Bank, interview, 28 September 2005. Suva, Fiji. 
GOVERNANCE OF TUNA INDUSTRIES IN THE WCPO 17 
administration and policy strategy could clearly improve profitability and sustainability, 
but where human resources significantly restrict the capacity to improve governance.  
 
3.2 Social and Political Factors and Consultation in Fisheries 
Governance 
Access fees are a fairly obvious example of how governance may affect 
profitability and sustainability in fisheries. The rest of this paper considers areas that are 
less directly connected to profitability and sustainability, but arguably no less important. 
Politics is usually seen as something that should be kept out of fisheries management. 
Social issues are more widely recognized as a legitimate part of fisheries management 
but they are not generally taken as a serious core issue. Since fisheries management is 
more about managing people’s impact on fish rather than about managing fish per se, 
however, fisheries management should always take social and political factors into 
consideration. One reason for this is that social and political problems arising from tuna 
developments may rebound negatively on those developments, exacerbating already 
difficult business environments. 
Development of tuna industries in PICs has usually been perceived as socially 
destructive. While people have appreciated the employment opportunities offered by 
such developments, tuna processing factories in Fiji, Solomon Islands, and PNG have 
had bad public reputations. They have been widely seen as offering unpleasant unsafe 
work for substandard wages, as causing social breakdown, and as polluting the 
surrounding environment (Emberson-Bain 1994; Stinus-Remonde 2004; Hughes and 
Thaanum 1995; Sasabe 1993; Sullivan et al. 2003). Companies have tried to improve 
their image through community relations programs, but have not managed to effectively 
address public disquiet. Fisheries managers and other local leaders have often tended to 
contribute to the rhetoric of corporate misbehaviour (Hughes and Thaanum 1995), 
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sometimes apparently in an effort to shore up support for themselves by representing 
tuna companies as exploitative, neocolonial foreign capital. 
Failure to address the negative social reputations of tuna processing companies 
has meant social groups continue to attack them. PNG-based Philippines-owned tuna 
fishing and processing company RD has been the target of petty extortion rackets (Post-
Courier 2005) and has been tied up in legal battles with landowner groups and an NGO 
that RD perceives as having slandered the company (Friends of Kananam c.2003). The 
social ill will generated by many tuna developments in the region is thus part of a 
generally unfavourable business environment.  
One of the factors contributing to widespread social ill will against industrial 
tuna developments in the Pacific is the pervasive belief that commercial tuna industries 
are depleting the resources villagers catch for food and income. Nearshore fisheries are 
of paramount importance for food security, health and income of coastal PIC 
populations (Chapman 2004). It is common to hear from small-scale and recreational 
fishers in PICs that is it now much harder it is to catch tuna than it was 10 or 15 years 
ago, and commercial tuna fisheries are usually seen as the main cause of the apparent 
decline in resources,7 although there is little research based evidence either way, and 
fisheries officers in Solomon Islands feel that increased populations in coastal areas, 
pollution, over fishing, and unsustainable fishing practices (such as dynamite fishing) 
are also having a negative impact on the health of coastal fisheries resources.8 
It is also commonly believed that large-scale tuna processing plants in PNG and 
Solomon Islands pollute the surrounding environment, and damage reef fish stocks 
                                                 
7 Some of the interviewees who expressed this opinion in 2005 included: Steve Dunn, Deputy Director, 
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), interview, 12 July 2005, Honiara, Solomon Islands; Nauan Bauro, 
General Manager, Kiribati Fisherman Services Company Limited (KFS), interview 13 October 2005, 
Bairiki, Tarawa, Kiribati; Keith Kingston, Lae businessman and recreational game fisherman, personal 
communication, 15 May 2005, Lae, Papua New Guinea; Emmanueal Tamba, Fisheries Extension Officer, 
New Ireland Provincial Government, interview, 26 May 2005, Kavieng, Papua New Guinea; Peter 
Ramohia, Research Officer, Fisheries Department, interview, 15 July 2005. Honiara, Solomon Islands. 
8 Government of Solomon Islands. 2005. National Fisheries Workshop, Solomon Islands National and 
Provincial Fisheries Departments, at King Solomon Hotel, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 25 July - 3 August. 
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(Barclay 2001; Sullivan et al. 2003). Some research has been conducted into the 
pollution effects of large-scale canneries Solomon Taiyo and RD (Benet Monico 2003; 
Mani 1994; Wallis 1999), but PIC governments have not implemented ongoing 
environmental monitoring or enforcement schemes. Indeed, in the case of Solomon 
Taiyo, the greatest impetus for environmental monitoring and improving waste disposal 
was meeting the requirements for European market access, not domestic government 
regulation (Barclay 2001).  
More effective governance of nearshore fisheries would be based on 
consultation with coastal communities and include monitoring of the effects of 
industrial tuna fisheries and processing (as well as other influences), and putting 
effective measures in place to halt any declines in nearshore fisheries resources. Recent 
government, non-government and aid donor supported establishment of community 
based coastal resource management in several PICs could evolve in this direction. Thus 
far, however, these mechanisms still do not monitor or disseminate information about 
the impacts of commercial tuna enterprises on coastal fisheries. 
Another source of public dissatisfaction with tuna industries in the WCPO is the 
range of social problems including prostitution, substance abuse and violence that arise 
around international ports and tuna factories (Barclay 2001; Emberson-Bain 1994; 
Sullivan et al. 2003; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2004). For example, 35,000 men 
from the southern Philippines work overseas on fishing vessels and call into ports 
including those in Solomon Islands as well as PNG, Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan. 
According to a health official from General Santos City in Mindanao, many of these 
fishermen engage in ‘extremely risky behaviour’ when they finish a trip, including sex 
with multiple partners (often involving binge drinking and sex workers), injection of 
recreational drugs, and insertion of penile implants. While the General Santos official 
knew of no cases of HIV/AIDS reported among the fishermen, it was noted that there 
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appeared to be a high rate of tuberculosis among the fishermen, which is recognized to 
be an indicator of AIDS (Solomon Star 2004). PNG’s rates of HIV/AIDS are now very 
high. Vessels visiting PNG could contract the disease and spread it around the Pacific 
very quickly.  
Another important factor contributing to social dissatisfaction with tuna 
developments in PICs is that the distribution of benefits from the industries has been 
seen as inequitable. Pacific Islander interviewees were particularly concerned that 
benefits from tuna developments should be felt in rural or outer island areas, and the 
fact that benefits from tuna industries have generally not been realized at the village 
level (except in the few areas supplying workers) was seen by interviewees as a major 
failing in PICs’ fisheries development policies. This was often expressed in the 
following terms: ‘villagers see the tuna boats fishing off their coast, they feel the tuna 
boats are taking their resources, yet they get nothing in return’.9 Strictly legally PIC 
villagers have no claim in customary tenure to offshore resources, however, the social 
reality of customary marine tenure in PICs is that villagers sometimes assert rights over 
resources they did not use in custom (Kinch et al. 2005). Furthermore, anecdotes 
suggest that industrial fishers often come in much closer to shore than they should, 
particularly longliners targetting reef sharks.10 The belief that commercial tuna fisheries 
are taking villagers’ resources without giving any return to villagers is one of the factors 
contributing to social ill will towards commercial tuna industries in PICs.  
Interviewees often hoped that rural fishers could somehow become involved in 
commercial tuna fisheries, but the perishable nature of the product makes it difficult for 
small scale fishers to transport tuna to markets at a viable cost, and small vessels are 
much less efficient than large industrial vessels. Another way coastal villagers could 
                                                 
9 Aini, John. 2005. Trainer, Ailan Awareness NGO and Data Management Specialist, PNG National 
Fisheries Authority Coastal Fisheries Management and Development Project (ADB Project). Interview, 
26 May. Kavieng, Papua New Guinea. 
10 These vessels often operate illegally, their catches are often in competition with local fishers, and they 
have the potential to disrupt reef and reef slope ecosystems by removing a top predator. 
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benefit from commercial tuna industries is if a portion of the commercial fisheries 
license fees are channelled into trust funds for rural coastal development projects. Most 
of the Tuna Management and Development Plans in the Pacific include such a policy, 
but Marshall Islands was the only one of the countries visited for fieldwork in 2005 that 
had implemented the policy.  
The most significant strategy that has been employed by PICs to distribute 
benefits from tuna industries has been to spread industrial tuna developments away 
from established industrial or urban centres. In PNG this has led to large-scale tuna 
processing ventures in Madang, Wewak and Lae, with longline developments spread 
even more widely. In Solomon Islands there are tuna bases at Tulagi and Noro, with an 
additional base planned for Bina Harbour in Malaita. In Fiji the Pafco cannery/loining 
plant is located away from the capital, at Levuka on Ovalau. 
The problem with spreading tuna developments out geographically is that 
having many locations for industrial development exacerbates the diseconomies of scale 
that already damage the economic viability of PIC developments. Countries such as 
China have demonstrated the economic success that may be achieved by consolidating 
industrial development in special economic and export processing zones. Consolidating 
tuna fishing, service and supply and processing industries geographically could generate 
business development in clusters of firms with operational synergies, which share a pool 
of infrastructure and resources (including human) that improve as more companies join 
the hub (Bowman 2005). For this reason RD has been trying to attract more businesses 
to Madang for some years. The PNG government, however, seems to want ‘a tuna 
factory in every port’, echoing the ‘meat cannery in every town’ scenario of the late 
1980s that saw the establishment, and subsequent collapse, of several competitors to 
James Barnes Pty Ltd’s monopoly (Bowman 2005). Solomon Islands and Fiji are 
equally committed to having tuna industries in regional areas for social and political 
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reasons. In these cases social and political factors are being considered in fisheries 
governance, but at the expense of, rather than in balance with, economic imperatives.  
Better management of the social and political aspects of fisheries development 
could facilitate a widespread sense of social benefit rather than the social dislocation 
and polarization of groups for and against that characterizes tuna development in the 
Pacific. One way to address this cluster of social and political problems affecting 
profitability (through the business environment) and sustainability (especially in coastal 
areas) of Pacific tuna industries is to improve consultative processes in fisheries 
governance.  
 PICs’ fisheries governance has on the whole been marked by a lack of 
consultation; between government departments, with affected communities, with social 
and environmental non-government organizations, and between government and 
industry. PIC officials have tended not to see the potential value of non-government 
organization (NGO) input, and tended to treat fisheries governance as being a purely 
government responsibility, rather than engaging in consultative decision making 
processes with other stakeholders (Cartwright 2004). PIC governments are not used to 
including NGOs and do not really see NGOs as being legitimate voices in decision-
making processes. Working with other stakeholders, however, would enable 
government departments to improve outcomes in terms of profitability and 
sustainability in tuna industries in various ways, especially in the context of very limited 
human resources in PIC government departments.  
Closer consultation with industry helps government make better informed 
management and development policies and better administer regulations, especially in 
terms of setting fees and ensuring compliance. Strong fishing associations that have 
actively engaged with government departments have been positively correlated with 
industry development in places like Fiji and PNG, while poor industry-government 
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dialogue in places like Solomon Islands has correlated with more difficult business 
environments (Gillett 2003). Some PIC officials, however, take an adversarial approach 
to industry NGOs (INGOs) (Gillett 2003), and PIC officials have demonstrated a 
reluctance to include industry representatives in fisheries negotiations in fora such as the 
Preparatory Conferences for the establishment of the WCPFC (Cartwright 2004).  
 There has been even more reluctance on the part of government officials to 
include environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in governance processes, due to perceptions that 
such groups are anti-developmental, anti-government, or too ‘Western’ to be a 
legitimate part of Pacific Islander governance (Gillett 2003; Cartwright 2004). 
Environmental organizations, however, can help with governance in several different 
ways. One is to collaborate in resource management, as several groups are currently 
doing with coastal marine protected areas and community based coastal resource 
management around the Pacific. ENGOs and social issues based NGOs may also 
facilitate consultation with village communities about coastal social and environmental 
issues. The ENGO Ailan Awareness in New Ireland in PNG has taken on this role.  
Environmental groups can also indirectly help with the profitability of fisheries. 
Constraints relating to environmental issues are becoming increasingly important for 
tuna industries. These issues may be relatively minor compared to tuna stocks and 
bycatch management, but they impact on PICs’ ability to sell their products in the 
sensitive markets of the USA and Europe. A study has found that 79 per cent of 
European consumers, supermarket buyers, chefs and restaurateurs said that the 
environmental impact of seafood is an important factor in their purchasing decisions 
(WWF 2005). In 2004 sales of tuna loins from Solomon Islands to Italy were blocked 
by European environmentalists campaigning against Solomon Islands allowing live 
dolphins to be caught and exported for amusement parks. International campaigns to 
ban long lining because of stock depletion in some tuna species and incidental deaths of 
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birds, turtles and sharks damage the public image of tuna as a product, as does pollution 
from vessels and ship groundings. Some environmental groups can work with 
governments and industry to improve environmental performance in fisheries, with 
positive outcomes for both sustainability and profitability. 
 Greater consultation with civil society groups and other government departments 
could also improve governance of the social, welfare and health problems that arise 
around tuna ports and factories. Ideally, a wide range of services would be provided 
around these centres, including advice about prevention of and treatment for sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs); services for women who are subject to violence and other 
problems related to prostitution and substance abuse; and physical and mental health 
services for crews who are out at sea for months on end, often on cramped vessels. 
Many Pacific Island ports have an extremely limited range of activities available for 
visiting fishing crews. While vessels are in port in the Pacific crews may have virtually 
nothing to do, and crew who do not want to engage in sex or substance abuse have 
nowhere to escape these activities occurring on board. In other parts of the world crew 
have the option to stay at ‘Seafarer’s Angel’ houses and get away from their boat for a 
few days. Interviewees suggested that providing visiting crew with a wider range of 
social amenities around port areas, such as shops, cinemas and restaurants, would help 
diffuse crews’ more socially undesirable behaviours (Barclay and Cartwright 2005). 
 Clearly fisheries departments alone cannot be expected to develop the full range 
of expertise needed to cover all aspects of fisheries governance by themselves. 
Consultation and collaboration is the only feasible way to address all of the disparate 
biological, economic, social and political issues raised in fisheries development and 
management. As with improving governance of access fees, however, the capacity to 
consult and collaborate is constrained by resources. Small government departments find 
it difficult enough to cover a narrow range of fisheries functions and would require 
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more staff to be able to work with other government departments and NGOs on health 
and social welfare issues related to tuna industries. For ENGOs to participate effectively 
in the regional fisheries management negotiations ongoing within the WCPFC a great 
deal of international travel is required, and many local NGOs simply cannot fund their 
employees to do this travel (Cartwright 2004). Even INGOs find it difficult to justify the 
time and money to participate effectively in governance processes, which are run by 
bureaucrats and include lengthly committee meetings (Cartwright 2004). Interviewees 
noted in 2005 that this was the main reason that the regional fishing industry association 
established in 2004 had thus far not really worked as planned. 
Nevertheless, the value of consultative processes seems to be more widely 
recognized by PIC officials than it was in the past, and the extent of consultation in PIC 
fisheries governance seems to be increasing. In July-August 2005, the Solomon Islands 
government held a national workshop to set government’s strategic plan for fisheries, 
which included significant ENGO participation. And in late 2005 the Fijian government 




Since the PICs extended control over fishing grounds to 200 nautical miles out 
from their coastlines in the 1970s they have achieved a great deal in terms of fisheries 
governance in some areas. They have established excellent scientific data collection for 
stock assessment, collaborated for maritime surveillance, and developed regional and 
international organizations (SPC, FFA and the WCPFC) to assist with fisheries 
management and development advice. But not much headway has been made in 
furthering the core fisheries management goals of promoting maximum economic 
benefit and sustainability. Seeing the will and capacity of PIC governments to promote 
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profitability and sustainability as a governance issue helps explain this state of affairs 
and suggest strategies for improving the situation.  
Anti-corruption is only one small part of what we mean by ‘governance’; the 
main thrust of the argument is that governance of fisheries management and 
development should be conceived of broadly to include a range of biological, economic, 
social and political issues. The limited resources within PIC governments and in civil 
society constrain the extent to which fisheries governance can be addressed in this way, 
but the examples presented in this paper show that significant achievements may occur 
through adjusting mindsets and ways of doing things, some of which may not require 
great funding increases. When PICs are better able to promote economically efficient 
outcomes and sustainability in their domestic spheres through improved governance, 
they should also have greater will and capacity to achieve profitable and sustainable 
fisheries for the region.  
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